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Abstract
Prototypingis often used to predict, or reduce the uncertainty over, the future prof-
itability of a software design choice. Boehm [3] pioneered the use of techniques from
Bayesian decisiontheorytoprovidea basis for makingprototypingdecisions. However,
thisapproach does notapply tosituationswhere thesoftwareengineer has theﬂexibility
ofwaitingformoreinformationbeforemakingaprototypingdecision. Also,thisframe-
workonlyassumes uncertaintyover one time period, and assumes a design-choice must
be made immediately after prototyping. We propose a more general multi-period ap-
proach that takes into account the ﬂexibility of being able to postpone the prototyping
and design decisions. In particular, we argue that this ﬂexibility is analogous to the
ﬂexibility of exercise of certain ﬁnancial instruments called options, and that the value
of the ﬂexibility is the value of the corresponding ﬁnancial option. The ﬁeld of real
option theory in ﬁnance provides a rigorous framework to analyze the optimal exercise
of such options, and this can be applied to the prototyping decision problem. Our ap-
proach integrates the timing of prototypedecisions and design decisions withina single
framework.
1 Introduction
Althoughmuchprogresshasbeenmade intheidentiﬁcationofkeysoftwaredesignparadigms
andconcepts(suchasinformation-hiding,prototyping,reuse, andprogram-families), thecri-
teria for making decisions about how to use these concepts have largely been ad-hoc. For
1instance, consider a software engineer faced with the decision of whether to change the im-
plementation of a cache-coherence protocol in a certain distributed database management
system. The economic proﬁtability of the new protocol depends on which of two possible
future scenarios will occur. In one scenario, the new protocol would work extremely well,
whereas in the other, it might degrade performance. The two scenarios are perhaps estimated
to be equally likely, but we do not know which one will occur. Prototyping can be a way to
predict (or reduce our uncertainty over) which scenario will occur. Based on the prototype
the software engineer can perhaps revise his estimate of the probabilityof the favorable sce-
nario to 70%, and then decide whether or not to change the protocol. Of course constructing
and evaluating the prototype involves an expenditure of limited resources such as program-
mer time, CPU time and memory space. Thesoftwareengineer must therefore weighthecost
of prototypingagainst the beneﬁt of prototyping. The beneﬁt of prototyping(as we show in
an example later) is the increased expected payoff from a more informed decision based on
prototyping,compared to a decision withoutprototyping.
Boehm [2, 3] was among the ﬁrst to propose an appealing economics-based approach
to providing a sound basis for software decisions in general and prototyping decisions in
particular. His approach views software decisions as problems of investing in the face of
uncertainty over the future payoffs from the investment. In his model, the effect of prototyp-
ing is to change the conditional probabilities of adopting each design alternative given that
the future is one of a certain set of possible scenarios. He applies techniques from Bayesian
decision theory to calculate the expected payoff from a prototypingdecision.
Although the Bayesian approach recognizes the importance of uncertainty in modeling
prototyping decisions, it has some limitations. To begin with, this approach is based on the
traditional net present value (NPV) analysis found in business textbooks: First calculate the
present value of the future beneﬁts that the investment (i.e. prototyping and the consequent
design choice) will generate. If the future beneﬁts are uncertain, compute the expectation of
this present value. Next calculate the (expectation of the) present value of the prototyping
and design cost. The NPV is the ﬁrst quantityminus the second, i.e., beneﬁt minuscost. The
software engineer then applies the NPV rule traditionally found in business textbooks (e.g.,
[5]): if the NPV is positive then proceed with the investment, otherwise don’t. However,
this simple rule is often suboptimal, since it is founded on a faulty assumption. It views the
investor’s (or software engineer’s) decision as a now-or-never decision, in the sense that if
the prototypingisnot done now, the opportunityis lostfor ever. Thusif the onlypossibilities
available to the investor are to invest now or investnever, then indeed he or she shouldinvest
if and only if the NPV is positive. However, most investment decisions, including those in
the software area, can be delayed. This is especially true when a certain implementation of
the software is already in place, and a design change is being considered. This brings into
play several other possible strategies that must be considered when picking the optimal one.
Speciﬁcally, the investor’s decision can be contingent on what kind of future unfolds. For
instance the investor can wait for a month, and decide to not invest if the next month reveals
information that indicatesthat there wouldbe no net positivepayoff from the investment. Or
perhaps after a month there is less uncertainty about the proﬁtabilityof the investment. This
2type of wait-and-see strategycan have a larger expected payoff (even when discountedto the
present time) than investing right away, so that even when the above NPV rule indicates an
investment, it would be suboptimal to invest right away. Of course, if the expenditures can
somehow be recovered when conditions turn sour, then the decision to invest is effectively
reversible, and inthis case it wouldsufﬁce to considerthis as a now-or-never decision. How-
ever, the expense of undertaking a software design decision cannot usually be recovered. In
this sense software decisions, including prototyping decisions, are irreversible but capable
of being delayed.
Another limitation of the statistical decision theory framework for prototyping is that it
only assumes one period of uncertainty, and assumes that both the prototyping and design
decisions are made in this period. However in reality, once the prototypingis done, the soft-
ware engineer can wait several time periods during which additional uncertainties might be
resolved before making his design choice(especially if a design changeisbeingconsidered).
In this paper we view the prototyping and design decisions not merely as investments
under uncertainty (as previous work has done), but more speciﬁcally as irreversible but de-
layable investments under uncertainty. In a growing body of research [7, 8, 9, 10, 13], this
viewpointis being increasinglyaccepted as theappropriate one(as opposedto the traditional
NPV rule) for analyzing capital investments by companies in the face of an uncertain future.
Rather than viewing investments as being either now-or-never propositions or as being re-
versible, this approach stresses the fact that companies have opportunitiesto invest, and that
they must decide how best to exploit these opportunities. At any time, the company has the
optiontomake the investment: ithasthe opportunity,butisnotobligatedto, make theinvest-
ment. The success of this new research is based on the important observationthat investment
opportunities are analogous to ﬁnancial call options (see Section 2.2 for details), and that
when a company makes an irreversible investment, it in effect “exercises” its call option. In
fact, to make the analogy explicit, the investment opportunity available to the company has
been called a “real option”. A real option is the ﬂexibility a manager has for making deci-
sions about real assets (in contrast to shares of stock) [12]. Thus the company’s investment
problem is essentiallyone of optimally exercising its call option. The valuation and optimal
exercise of ﬁnancial options has been an active area of research in ﬁnance over the past two
decades. Researchers have been applying results from the well-establishedarea of optionsto
capital investment problems, and this has lead to the new ﬁeld of real option theory.
In this paper we are advocating a similar use of the options approach to study software
prototyping and design decision problems. This has the beneﬁt that we can draw upon the
research done in the area of real options. A preliminary paper outlining this approach was
presented by one of the authors at the 1996 Software Architectures Workshop [14]. A more
detailed paper that applies our ideas to software design decisions appears in [15]. Withey
[16] also applies real optionsideas to analyze strategies for buildingreusable software mod-
ules. Baldwin and Clark [1] have used the theory of real options to quantify the beneﬁts of
modularityinterms of increaseddesignﬂexibility. The presentpaper focussesondeveloping
modelsfor analyzingprototypingstrategiesaswellas designstrategiesthatare inﬂuencedby
prototyping. Our basic premise is that prototyping, unlike other software design decisions,
3affects our beliefs about the probabilities of future events or “states of nature”. The models
just mentioned therefore cannot be used to model the effects of prototyping. An additional
complication in the current paper is that we studythe optimal timing of both the prototyping
decision and the resulting design decision in the same framework. (Our earlier paper [15]
alludes informally to the possibility of modeling multiple decisions.) Thus in the present
paper we need a signiﬁcantly richer model.
Our proposal is that formulating software prototyping criteria in terms of real options
addresses the limitationsof earlier work on prototyping. Moreover, thisapproach can lead to
previously unrecognized design principles. Our goal is to show that real options theory can
help describe, and perhaps even prescribe, software prototypingand design decision-making
behaviors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 introduce the nec-
essary concepts from probability theory and ﬁnancial options. Section 3 describes the basic
idea of real option theory and how to apply it to software design decisions. Section 4.2
present our model of prototypingand design-decisionsbased on the options viewpoint. Sec-
tion5concludeswitha discussionofthecontributionsofthispaper, itslimitations,andfuture
research directions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Probability concepts
In this section we introduce some standard mathematical terminology and notation that is
used in the paper. Much of this material also appears in our earlier paper [15]. We will
model future uncertainty by means of a discrete decision tree of ﬁnite depth
N,w h e r e
N
represents the maximum number of future time steps (e.g. months, years, etc) that we wish
to model. The root node is considered to be at depth 0 and represents the present time, i.e.,
time 0. The nodesatdepth
k representthepossiblestatesofthe worldat time
k. The children
of a depth
k node
v are the possible next-states at time
k
+
1 , given that the state at time
k
is
v. If a node
w is a descendant of
v, we write
v
!
w.F o r
k
=
0
;
1
;
:
:
:
;
N,arandom
variable
X is a mapping (or function)that associates with each node
v, a real number
X
(
v
).
A random process is a sequence of random variables
f
X
k
g
N
k
=
0, (often referred to brieﬂy as
the “process
X
k”) where for each
k,
X
k
(
v
) has non-zero values only for nodes at depth
k.
Whenwe wanttorefer tothevalueof arandom process
X
k at a speciﬁc node
v, we willoften
drop the subscript and just write
X
(
v
). In any decision tree, we deﬁne the special random
variable
￿
(
v
) to be the depth of
v.
As an illustrative example, it is useful to have the following simple decision tree, called
the binomial tree, in mind. Imagine we toss a coin
N times. Each non-leaf node in this
tree has two children. Each of the
2
N paths in the tree represents a particular sequence of
coin-toss outcomes. On any path, for
k
=
1
;
:
:
:
;
N,t h e
k’th branch is an up-branch if the
k’th coin-toss lands heads (
H), and it is a down-branch if it lands tails (
T).
With each branch in an decision tree, we associate a probability in such a way that the
4sum of the probabilities of the branches emanating from a given node is 1. In particular, if
a node
v has a branch to node
w, we denote the probability on the branch by P
(
w
j
v
).F o r
instance if we toss a fair coin in the example above, the probability of each branch is 0.5.
For any node
v in the decision tree, the probability that state
v will occur, denoted P
(
v
),i s
computed in the obvious way: multiply the probabilitiesof the branches from the root node
to
v. Clearly,
P
(
w
j
v
)
=P
(
w
)
=P
(
v
)
:
The expectation of a random variable
X, denoted by E
(
X
),i sd e ﬁ n e da s
E
(
X
)
=
X
v
X
(
v
)P
(
v
)
: (1)
The concept of conditionalexpectation is an important one for this paper. Let us imagine we
are in a particular state of the world at time
k, i.e., at a particular node
v at depth
k.T h e n
the conditional expectation of a random variable
X, given that we are at
v, is denoted by
E
(
X
j
v
), and is deﬁned as
E
(
X
j
v
)
=
X
w
:
v
!
w
X
(
w
)
P
(
w
)
P
(
v
)
X
w
:
v
!
w
X
(
w
)P
(
w
j
v
)
; (2)
which is just a form of the familiar Baye’s rule. Clearly this conditional expectation will
in general be different from E
X, and will depend on which depth-
k node
v we’re at. For
instance in the coin-toss tree above, suppose the random variable
H
k is the number of heads
up to time
k, on the path to a speciﬁc node in the tree. Then if
v is at depth
k and
m
￿
k,t h e
conditionalexpectation E
(
H
m
j
v
) will be higher if the path to
v consistsof more heads.
We will use decision trees in this paper to model the timing of various investment deci-
sions. For instance we might want to decide when (i.e. at which nodes in the tree) and how
much to invest in building a software prototype. In general let us assume that at any node
we are allowed
c possiblelevels of investment, numbered
1
;
2
;
:
:
:
;
c. We consider level 0 to
represent no investment. A decision rule
￿ with respect to a decision tree
T is a mapping
from the set of nodes of
T to the set
f
0
;
1
;
:
:
:
;
c
g, withthe restrictionthat on any path of the
tree, thereisatmostonenode
v witha non-zerovalueof
￿
(
v
). In otherwords,a decisionrule
speciﬁes a rule that we can follow as the state of the world changes along the tree. Whenever
we are in a state
v for which
￿
(
v
)
6
=
0 , we invest at level
￿
(
v
). In the coin-tossbinomialtree,
an example of a decision-rule is: “invest at level 1 when the coin has landed heads 3 times”,
or more formally:
￿
(
v
)
=
1if
H
(
v
)
=
3 ,a n d
￿
(
v
)
=
0otherwise. Those familiar with
stochastic processes will recognize that decision rules are closely related to stoppingtimes.
2.2 Financial Options
We now describe some basic concepts in option theory. For further details the reader is
referred to Hull’s [11] excellent introductory text.
The simplest kinds of options are call options. An American call option on a certain
stock is a ﬁnancial contract with the followingfeatures: it gives the holder of the contract the
5right but not the obligation to buy a share of the stock at a ﬁxed price called the strike (or
exercise)p r i c e
Lfrom thewriter(i.e. seller)ofthecontract,onorbefore acertainexpiration
date of
T time units. The holder thus has the “option” of deciding whether or not to exercise
the contract, i.e., demand a share of stock at the strike price
L from the contract writer. This
is why the contract is called an option. When the option is exercised or the option expires,
the option ceases to exist. Thus option exercise is irreversible.
In order to discount future cash ﬂows to the present time, we will need to assume that
money can be borrowed or lent (for example, via a bank or government bond) at a risk-free
interest rate of
r. Thus a dollar lent or borrowed at (discrete) time
k is worth
R
=
1
+
r
dollar at time
k
+
1 . It is common to refer to
R as a discount factor since a dollar at time
k,
discountedto the present time (i.e. time 0) is worth
1
=
R
k.
To describe an American call option formally, we will model the price of the underlying
s t o c ki nt e r m so fad e p t h -
N decision-tree. The time
N corresponds to the expiration of the
option. We let
f
S
k
g be the random process that denotes the price of the underlying stock.
It is clear that the holder should not exercise the option at a node
v if
S
(
v
)
￿
L.O n t h e
other hand, if
S
(
v
)
>
L , the holder can (but is not obligated to) exercise the option, and
if she does, the option writer is obligated to sell her a share of stock at the strike price
L.
The holder could then immediately sell the share in the market at
S
(
v
), and make a proﬁt of
S
(
v
)
￿
L. Thus the proﬁt that can be realized by exercising the American call option at time
k is
m
a
x
(
S
(
v
)
￿
L
;
0
), which we refer to as the payoff
G
(
v
) from the option. It is standard
notation to denote
m
a
x
f
x
;
0
g by
x
+, so we can write the payoff as the random variable
G
k
=
(
S
k
￿
L
)
+
; (3)
or in other words, for any node
v, the payoff
G
(
v
)
=
(
S
(
v
)
￿
L
)
+.
What is the best exercise strategy for the holder of an American call option, if she is still
holding it at time
k? Any exercise strategy can be described by a decision rule (deﬁned in
the previous section)
￿ that maps nodes to the set
f
0
;
1
g.I fw ea r ei ns t a t e
v,w ee x e r c i s e
if and only if
￿
(
v
)
=
1 . An example of an exercise strategy is: “exercise when the stock
price exceeds a certain threshold
￿, or the expiration date is reached”, and is described by
the decision rule
￿ where
￿
(
v
)
=
1if
S
(
v
)
￿
￿ or the depth
￿
(
v
) of the node
v is
N,a n d
￿
(
v
)
=
0otherwise.
For a given exercise decision rule
￿, and a given node
v at depth
k, the expected value
of the strategy
￿ discounted to time
k is denoted by
V
￿
k , and is computed as follows. At any
node
w that is a descendant of
v in the tree, if the option is exercised (i.e.,
￿
(
w
)
=
1 ), the
payoff is
G
(
w
)
=
(
S
(
w
)
￿
L
)
+, and if it is not exercised the payoff is 0. Thus in general
at any node
w we can write the payoff as
G
(
w
)
￿
(
w
),w h i c hi sw o r t h
G
(
w
)
￿
(
w
)
R
k
￿
￿
(
w
) at
time
k. Therefore the expected value of the strategy
￿, discounted to time
k, given that we
are at a node
v,i s
V
￿
k
(
v
)
=E
￿
G
￿
R
k
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
v
￿
: (4)
6Our option holder would of course want to choose the strategy
￿ so that this expectation is
maximized. We denote this maximum by the random variable
V
k:
V
k
(
v
)
=
m
a
x
￿
V
￿
k
(
v
)
: (5)
In other words,
V
k is the best expected present value at time
k realizable over all possible
exercise strategies. We refer to this value as the option value at time
k, for reasons that will
become clear shortly.
Since immediate exercise is a valid strategy at any time, the option value
V
(
v
) must
be at least as large as
(
S
(
v
)
￿
L
)
+. In fact, if
(
S
(
v
)
￿
L
)
+
<
V
(
v
), this means that the
immediate exercise strategy is not optimal, and that some other strategy will yield a strictly
greater expected present value of payoff, under our assumed stock price model. Thus in this
situation,itisbeneﬁcial to notexercise and wait. Onthe other hand, if
(
S
(
v
)
￿
L
)
+
=
V
(
v
),
then there is nothing to be gained in waiting, at least under our assumed stock price model.
In this case it is optimal to exercise immediately. Indeed it can be shown rigorously that the
decision rule
￿ that achieves the maximum in (5) above is given by
￿
(
v
)
=
(
1 if
(
S
(
v
)
￿
L
)
+
=
V
(
v
) or
￿
(
v
)
=
N,
0 otherwise.
(6)
Let us look at the optimal exercise rule from a cost-beneﬁt viewpoint. We can think of
the strike price
L as the “cost” of exercising the option, since this is the price one must pay
to obtain a share of stock. Similarly,
S
k is the beneﬁt from exercising at time
k, since this is
the price one would obtain by selling the stock in the market. We just remarked above that
it may not be optimal to exercise as soon as the beneﬁt
S
k exceeds the cost
L. To explain
this, it will be useful to view the option value
V
k as representing the “value of the choice to
exercise”. When the option is exercised, the option (and the choice) is killed and this value
is lost, so that
V
k represents the opportunity cost of exercising the option. Thus when the
option is exercised, there are two costs: the direct cost
L, and the opportunitycost
V
k.F r o m
the discussion above, the optimal exercise strategy is to exercise when
(
S
k
￿
L
)
+
=
V
k,
which in cost-beneﬁt terms can be stated as: Exercise only when the beneﬁt
S
k equals the
direct cost
L plus the opportunity cost
V
k. This viewpoint is the one that we will ﬁnd most
useful in this paper.
The value
V
k can be computed for all
k by a simple dynamic programming procedure
(see [6]) as follows. First observe that
V
N
=
(
S
N
￿
L
)
+. This isclear bothfrom formula (5)
and from observing that the since option expires at time
N, there is no advantage to waiting.
Now stepping backward in time in the decision tree, we compute
V
k
(
v
) at any depth
k node
v by
V
k
(
v
)
=
m
a
x
f
(
S
k
(
v
)
￿
L
)
+
;E
(
V
k
+
1
j
v
)
=
R
g
: (7)
In other words, the optionvalue
V
k
(
v
) at a depth
k node
v is the maximum of the immediate
payoff
(
S
k
(
v
)
￿
L
)
+ and the expected presentvalue of the optionvalue one time step ahead,
7given that we are at
v. It can be shown that this backward-recursive formula for
V
k and
formula (5) are equivalent. And this is true regardless of the speciﬁc process that the stock
price
S
k follows.
3 Real Options and Software Decisions
An investor holding an American call option is faced with a decision problem: when to
exercise his option. This situation is very similar to the problem faced by managers making
irreversible capital investment decisions. Suppose the manager of a manufacturing ﬁrm is
contemplating whether to invest in a large factory for making a new kind of widget. The
investment is irreversible, since the factory can only be used to make these widgets, and if
market conditions turn out to be unfavorable, the ﬁrm cannot regain its lost investment. For
simplicity let us say that the factory can be built instantaneously, at a cost
L, and that it can
produce widgets forever at zero cost. Once the factory is built, say at time
k, the widgetscan
be sold at the prevailing market price for such widgets. The future proﬁts from widget sales
depend on how the market price evolves, which is uncertain. Let
S
k be the expected value
of these future proﬁts, discountedto time
k, under a suitablemarket price model, probability
measure, and discounting factor. Thus
S
k represents the value of the asset that the ﬁrm can
acquire by exercising its option to invest
L at time
k. Alternatively, one can think of
S
k as
the “beneﬁt” from making the investment at time
k,a n d
L as the cost of the investment. In
this respect,
S
k is analogous to the price of a stock underlying an American call option, and
L represents the strike price. Clearly the ﬁrm will not invest in the factory if
S
k
<
L .
On the other hand, should the ﬁrm invest simply because
S
k exceeds
L? The traditional
Net Present Value (NPV) rule recommends investingin thissituation. However, thisrule can
often be suboptimal since it treats the decision problem as a now-or-never proposition. That
is, if there is no possibilityof delayingthe decision,then the rule is indeed reasonable. How-
ever, if the decisionto invest can be postponed,then the NPV rule ignores the value inherent
in waiting for better information before making the investment. The option viewpoint is the
natural framework in which to quantify the worth of the ﬂexibility of being able to choose
between investing now and any future time. Thus the value
V
k represents the “value of the
option to invest”, or the opportunity cost of investing, at time
k. The reason we think of
V
k
as an opportunity cost is that when we exercise the option, we lose the opportunity of being
able to decide when to invest. In analogy with the above rule for an American call option,
the optimal rule for the ﬁrm is (given suitable deﬁnitions of
S
k and
V
k): I n v e s ti ft h ea s s e t
value (or beneﬁt)
S
k exceeds the direct cost of the asset
L plusthe opportunitycost
V
k. This
idea is at the heart of the theory of real options [8, 13].
The above approach appliesto any investmentsituationwhere (a) there is an expenditure
of limited resources, (b) there is uncertainty over the future proﬁtability of the investment,
(c) the decision to invest is irreversible, and (d) the decision can be delayed. As we argued
before, many software engineering design decisions,and prototypingdecisionsin particular,
satisfy these criteria. In general suppose a software engineer is contemplating when (if at
8all) to invest in a prototype. In terms of the variables introduced above, the direct cost
L is the cost of implementing the prototype. The future proﬁt stream from prototyping is
uncertain, and may depend on several factors, such as changes in requirements, hardware,
usage-patterns, etc. This uncertainty can be modeled in terms of a decision tree (see Section
2.1 for deﬁnitions of this and other terms). At any discrete time
k,t h easset value or beneﬁt
S
k is the expected value, discountedto time
k, of the future (possiblynegative) proﬁt stream
that would result if the prototype were already in place by time
k. The option value
V
k is
then the opportunitycost of implementing the prototype – the value of the ﬂexibility(which
is lost when the prototype is implemented) of being able to decide when to implement the
prototype. Just as in the capital investment scenario above, the optimal decision strategy for
the software engineer is:
Invest in implementing the prototype when the beneﬁt
S
k is at least equal to the
direct cost
L plus the opportunitycost
V
k.
We have thus a rigorous way of quantifying when it is beneﬁcial to delay our decision to
invest in a prototype. In the next section we will present a model for the effect of prototypes.
We show how to compute the optimal timingof boththe prototypingdecision and the result-
ing design-change decision in the same decision tree. The above simple rule will need to be
modiﬁed when both the prototypingand design-changedecisions are considered together.
4 Prototypes as state-predictors
When a software designer is contemplating a major, expensive design change, he or she
may be concerned about the wisdom of going ahead with the change, since the beneﬁts of
making the change may depend on uncertain future events, or “states of nature”. In such a
situation, as Boehm has argued, it may be possible to obtain information about the future
states by building a prototype or simulation of the contemplated software design (or design
change). Although we are modeling prototypes as revealing information about future states
or events,essentiallythesame modelappliestoprototypesthatare usedtoreveal information
about the current state. In particular, we can view the prototypeas being done “just before”,
the current state unfolds, and the same mathematics holds. For instance in Boehm’s [3]
example the prototypereveals informationabout whether or notthe current state is favorable
to a certain design change. Our models are more general and cover scenarios such as those
discussed by Boehm. To understand our model it will be useful to review Boehm’s example
in [2] which we describe in the next subsection.
4.1 Boehm’s example
In the example in Boehm’s book [2], we are required to choose between a bold (
B)a n d
conservative (
C) approach in developing a certain special-purpose operating system. Since
there is no operating system to start with, a choice between these two approaches must be
made at the present time, which we call time 0. However, the proﬁtability of the operating
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Figure 1: Payoffs in Boehm’s example
system willdepend on the “state of nature” at time 1. There are two possiblestates of nature
at time 1: “favorable” (
F) and “unfavorable” (U), each occurring with probability 0.5 (see
Fig. 1): P
(
U
)
=P
(
F
)
=
0
:
5
: In general we denote the payoff of approach
a in state
s by
V
(
s
;
a
). In the absence of any information about the state at time 1, we wouldchoose either
approach B or approach C at time 0. In the bold case, the expected payoff would be
P
(
F
)
V
(
F
;
B
)
￿
P
(
U
)
V
(
U
;
B
)
=
6
0
;
and in the conservative case the expected payoff is 30. Can we do better if we have some
idea of what the next state at time 1 will be? Boehm considers the idea of building a rough
prototype of the key portions of the bold approach, in order to get information about the
time-1 state. First consider a perfect prototype, namely one thatwill predict exactly what the
next state will be. Let us say the cost of buildingthis prototype is
C
p
=
1
0 . If the prototype
tells us that the next state will be favorable, we would decide on approach B, and otherwise
we wouldpick approach C. The expected net payoff in this case would be
P
(
F
)
V
(
F
;
B
)
+P
(
U
)
V
(
U
;
C
)
￿
C
p
=
9
0
￿
1
0
=
8
0
;
which is better than the payoffs without prototyping.
One way to view the effect of the perfect prototype in this example is that it gives us a
way of making our decision at time 0 be contingent on the next state. To see this, in this
subsection only, we let P
(
a
j
s
) denote the conditionalprobability that we pick approach
a at
time 0 given that the next state is
s. In the absence of a prototype, our decision cannot be
contingenton the next state, so we would either have
P
(
C
j
U
)
=P
(
C
j
F
)
=
1
; P
(
B
j
U
)
=P
(
B
j
F
)
=
0
; (8)
which corresponds to picking choice C, or
P
(
C
j
U
)
=P
(
C
j
F
)
=
0
; P
(
B
j
U
)
=P
(
B
j
F
)
=
1
; (9)
10which corresponds to picking choice B. Now if the perfect prototype predicts that state
F
willoccur at time 1, we wouldpick approach B at time 0, otherwisewe wouldpick approach
C (i.e. our decisionis contingenton the next state), so that
P
(
C
j
F
)
=
0
; P
(
C
j
U
)
=
1
; P
(
B
j
F
)
=
1
; P
(
B
j
U
)
=
0
:
Note that with or withouta prototypewe have
P
(
B
j
F
)
+P
(
C
j
F
)
=
1
; P
(
B
j
U
)
+P
(
C
j
U
)
=
1
: (10)
Thus our expected payoff with the perfect prototype can be written
P
(
U
)
[P
(
B
j
U
)
V
(
U
;
B
)
+P
(
C
j
U
)
V
(
U
;
C
)
]
+ P
(
F
)
[P
(
B
j
F
)
V
(
F
;
B
)
+P
(
C
j
F
)
V
(
F
;
C
)
]
￿
C
p
; (11)
which is 80, as computed before.
We can consider more generally an imperfect prototype, one where the only restriction
is that the conditional probabilities P
(
a
j
s
) satisfy (10). The expected net payoff from the
prototype is still given by (11). In particular, not using a prototype can be viewed as using
a completely uninformative prototype, in which case the conditional probabilities would be
given by either (8) or (9). Let us consider the prototype (costing 10) in Boehm’s example,
characterized by the conditionalprobabilities
P
(
C
j
F
)
=
0
:
1
; P
(
C
j
U
)
=
0
:
8
; P
(
B
j
F
)
=
0
:
9
; P
(
B
j
U
)
=
0
:
2
: (12)
Note that condition (10) is satisﬁed. Now the expected payoff, from (11), is
6
8.
Thustheeffectofanyprototypecanbemodeledbytheconditionalprobabilitiesofchoos-
ing various alternatives, in each of the possible next-states. We do not make explicit how
these conditionalprobabilitiesare arrived at.
4.2 Our model
As we just saw above, Boehm’s example (as well as his generalization) considers only one
time-period. Moreover, the prototyping decision and the choice between bold/conservative
must be done at the present time, since there is no software to start with. We now extend
this model in two ways: (a) We consider multiple time-periods, in the event-tree framework.
(b) We also assume that a software design is already in place, and a design-change is being
considered. This means that both the prototyping and design-change decisions can be de-
layed. In particularthe implementation-changedoesnot have totake place immediatelyafter
prototyping – the software engineer can wait until conditions (the “state of the world”) are
appropriate for this. We ﬁrst present a model for changing to a speciﬁc new design, and in
subsection 4.6 we generalize this to switching to one of several alternatives. We refer to the
design-change decision as the switching decision. The ability to delay both the prototyping
and switching decisions can lead to increased payoffs for the software engineer.
11We will henceforth use the word “prototype” to cover simulation as well. Althoughless
expensivethanchangingthesoftware,prototypingcanstillhave asigniﬁcantcost. Moreover,
the expense incurred in prototypingcannot be recovered,
1 making a prototypingdecisionan
irreversible one. However, the designer has the option to wait for better information before
buildinga prototype.
We present our model through a concrete example that is easy to generalize. Suppose a
database company X is contemplating whether to change the cache-coherence protocol on
their top-of-the-line distributed DBMS. Since the future is unknown, it is unclear how this
change will impact the company. It may be that in some scenarios the usage of the DBMS
is such that the change is unfavorable. The company therefore wants to invest in prototyping
and simulation. It is faced with the following two decisions:
￿ Decision P: When (if at all) to invest in prototypes and simulation software? For
simplicity, we assume that that prototypes and simulation software are built together
andinstantaneously. Toallowfordifferentlevelsofprototyping,weassumethattheset
A
=
f
a
1
;
a
2
;
:
:
:
;
a
r
g represents the possible amounts of money that can be invested
in prototypingat any time.
￿ Decision D: when (if at all) to switch to the new cache-coherence protocol? We of
course impose the restriction that prototypingcan not occur after switchingto the new
protocol.
We formulate our model in terms of a decision tree of depth
N (See Section 2.1 for basic
mathematical deﬁnitions). The branches of this decision tree represent various future events
that might have an impact on how much beneﬁt the new cache coherence protocol would
bring. Throughout this discussion we will refer to the depth 3 decision tree in Figure 2 for
illustrationpurposes.
In general, we assume that at any time there are
c possible levels of prototyping(i.e., the
possibleamounts of money we could spend prototyping),which we denote by
f
1
;
2
;
:
:
:
;
c
g.
Aspeciﬁc prototypingstrategycan thenbedescribedbyadecisionrule (asdeﬁnedinSection
2.1)
￿ that maps nodes
v in the decision tree to an element of
f
0
;
1
;
2
;
:
:
:
;
c
g. As before, we
interpret
￿
(
v
)
=
0as not investing in a prototype at node
v.W el e t
￿ denote the decision
rule that describes the timing of the decision to invest in the new cache-coherence protocol.
We assume that there is a ﬁxed cost to switchingto the new protocol, and therefore let
￿ be a
map from the nodes to
f
0
;
1
g. Since prototyping (if any) can never occur after switching to
the new protocol, we impose the restriction, for any node
w:
If
￿
(
w
)
>
0, then for all
v
!
w,
￿
(
v
)
=
0
: (13)
Note that we are allowing paths where prototyping is never undertaken (i.e. all nodes
v on
the path have
￿
(
v
)
=
0 ) but the new cache-coherence protocol is implemented (
￿
(
v
)
=
1
1Unless the prototype can be a part of the systembeing built. In the case of simulations the expenseis always
unrecoverable.
12t = 1
= 10 p
.5
.5
.5
.8
.7
.3
.7
.3
.9
.1
.5
.5
.5
90
90
70
150
100
80
60
120
50
= 30
.2
t = 1
(0.9)
(0.1)
(0.9)
(0.2)
(0.3)
(0.8)
(0.7)
(0.1)
p
60
150
170
170
160
100
Figure 2: A decision tree showing a prototypingstrategy
￿ and a strategy
￿ for switching to the new
implementation. The dark boxes indicate nodes
v where
￿
(
v
)
>
0, and the circles indicate nodes
where
￿
(
v
)
=
1 . The beneﬁt
S
k is shown alongsideeach nodeinitalics. The conditionalprobabilities
P
￿
k are shown in parentheses at the nodes where they are well-deﬁned. In the paper, a node is referred
to by the sequence of up (U) and down (D) branches that must be taken to reach the node. E.g., at
node UD, the beneﬁt
S
2
=
9
0 .
13somewhere on the path). Thus for a given prototyping decision
￿,t h e r ei sas e t
S
(
￿
) of
decision rules
￿ for decision D that satisfy the constraint (13). See Fig. 2 for an example of
￿ and
￿ that satisfy this restriction.
After doing a certain level of prototyping at a node
v, we can observe our path on the
decision tree, and make the switching decision at some node
w (say at depth
k)t h a ti sa
descendant of
v. When making this decision, we are using the prototype to give us some
indicationof whatthenext (i.e. time-
(
k
+
1
))statewillbe. Thisindicationmay beintheform
ofan explicitstate-prediction,butnotnecessarilyso. Inany case, as inthenumericalexample
of the previous subsection, we abstractly model the effect of the prototype as follows. For
each time-
(
k
+
1
)state
￿ such that
w
!
￿,w eh a v eaconditional probability of having
switched to the new implementation at node
w given that the successor-state of
w is
￿.W e
denote this conditional probability by the random variable P
￿
k
+
1
(
￿
), where we are using
the superscript
￿ to emphasize the dependence on the prototyping strategy
￿. Note that the
random variable P
￿ is only well-deﬁned on nodes
￿ that are descendantsof nodes
v where a
non-zeroprototypinginvestmentismade, i.e.,
￿
(
v
)
>
0. Thisdoesnotcause aproblemsince
we will onlyuse P
￿ where itis deﬁned. For instance inFig. 2, the conditionalprobabilityP
￿
1
at node
U is not deﬁned since there is no prototypeat time 0. On the other hand, at node UD
we have P
￿
2
=
0
:
3, which means the conditional probability of having switched to the new
design at time 1 at node U, given that the state at time 2 is UD, is 0.3.
For a node
v at depth
k,
S
k
(
v
) will denote the beneﬁt at time
k, at node
v, from the new
implementation, if the switching decision was made at time
k
￿
1 at the parent node of
v.
In general
S
k represents the present (i.e. time-
k) value of all future beneﬁts from the new
implementation. We let
L denote the direct cost of switching. We will assume a discount
factor of
R per time period.
Note that if we make a switching decision at some depth
k node
w and there is no non-
zero investment in prototypingprior to
w on the path to
w, then we immediately get a payoff
(
S
(
w
)
￿
L
)
+, which we denote by
G
￿
k
(
w
). This is also true if we switch to the new imple-
mentation at a leaf (depth
N) node in the tree, since there is no uncertainty after time
N.O n
the other hand, if
w is not a leaf node, and there was some non-zero level of prototyping at
an ancestor of
w, then even thoughwe speak of a “switchingdecision” at time
k (at node
w),
we are not necessarily switching since, depending on the probabilities P
￿
k
+
1,t h e r ei ss o m e
chance that we do not switch. In fact we are deciding whether to switch or not to switch, and
if we happen to decide not to switch, we are committed to this decision and cannot undo it
subsequently. Thus the switching decision made at
w translates into a probabilisticoutcome
at the successor-nodes of
w. Therefore the effective beneﬁt at time
k is the expected beneﬁt
from time
k
+
1(weightedby the conditionalprobabilitiesP
￿
k
+
1) discountedto time
k,g i v e n
that we are at
w,w h i c hi sE
(
S
k
+
1P
￿
k
+
1
=
R
j
v
). Therefore the payoff
G
￿
k
(
w
) at such a node
w
is
G
￿
k
(
w
)
=
￿
E
￿
S
k
+
1P
￿
k
+
1
=
R
￿
￿
￿
￿
w
￿
￿
L
￿
+
; (14)
From the above description it is clear that the effect of a prototyping decision
￿ is captured
14in thepayoff process
f
G
￿
k
g. Thus at any time
k, for any allowableprototypingstrategy
￿ and
any allowable switchingstrategy
￿
2
S
(
￿
), the value of these strategies at time
k, given that
we are in state
v, is (in analogy with (4) in Section 2.2)
V
￿
;
￿
k
(
v
)
=
R
kE
￿
￿
G
￿
R
￿
￿
￿
R
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
v
￿
: (15)
Therefore, in analogy with deﬁnition(5), we can deﬁne the value of our investment opportu-
nity at a depth
k node
v as
V
k
(
v
)
=
m
a
x
￿
m
a
x
￿
2
S
(
￿
)
V
￿
;
￿
k
(
v
)
: (16)
Since the number of possiblestrategies
￿ and
￿ is ﬁnite, both
m
a
x’es above exist. A modiﬁ-
cation of the dynamic programming algorithm of Section 2.2 can be used to compute
V
0,a s
well as the optimal times
￿
￿ and
￿
￿ for decisions P and D respectively.
A reasonable question at this point is to ask, “what do the optimal strategies
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
look like”? For instance, the optimal exercise strategy in the case of a simple call option
(where the only decision to be made is when to exercise the option) is easy to characterize
(see Section) 2.2):Exercise when the option value
V
k equals the payoff from immediateexer-
cise. Is there an analogous rule when we are considering two decisions, namely (a) when
to prototype (described by the optimal strategy
￿
￿), and (b) when to switch to the new im-
plementation (described by
￿
￿). To answer this, we must ﬁrst deﬁne what “the payoff from
deciding to prototype” means (Note that (14) already deﬁnes the payoff from a switching
decision). Suppose we decide to invest at level
x in a prototype at a depth
k node
v, i.e.,
￿
(
v
)
=
x. What is the payoff from this decision? This is simply the maximum discounted
expected payoff given that we are at node
v, over all possible switchingstrategies
￿:
Y
￿
k
(
v
)
=
m
a
x
￿ E
￿
￿
G
￿
R
k
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
v
￿
￿
￿
(
v
)
: (17)
Note that this payoff itselfis the value of an option,so in thissense when we are considering
the two strategies
￿ and
￿,w eh a v ea noption on an option. Another point to note is that
the ﬁrst term in the payoff represents the “beneﬁt” from prototyping at time
k at level
x,
whereas the second term,
x, of course representsthe costof prototyping. In analogywithour
characterization of the optimal exercise strategy for a simplecall option,we can say (and this
can be proved rigorously)thatthe optimalprototypingstrategy isto prototypeat time
k
￿
N
at a node
v at level
x if and only if the payoff
Y
￿
k
(
v
) equals the option value
V
k
(
v
).A s
mentioned before, we can view
V
k as the “opportunity cost” of prototyping at time
k since
this represents the option value that is lost when we decide to prototype at time
k. Therefore
in analogy with call options, the optimal prototypingstrategy is:
Implement a prototype at time
k at level
x only if the beneﬁt equals the proto-
typing cost
x plus the opportunitycost
V
k.
15To re-emphasize a point we have been making throughout this paper, previous work on pro-
totypingthat was based on the traditionalNPV rule has ignoredthe opportunitycost
V
k.T h e
above rule shows that it may be better to postpone prototyping even when the traditional
NPV rule recommends it.
Now, onceprototypinghas been doneat somelevel
￿
(
v
)at a node
v, wemust stilldecide
when to switch to the new implementation. This consists of ﬁnding which
￿ maximizes the
payoff
Y
￿
k
(
x
) deﬁned in 17. At this point the problem is very similar to that of deciding the
optimal exercise strategy of a call option, and this analogy has been explored at great length
in our earlier paper [15]. We only note here that it may be optimal to wait for a while after
prototypingbefore switchingto the new implementation.
4.3 How to use the model
To summarize, we describe here our suggested general procedure for a software engineer or
project manager faced with deciding when (if at all) to invest in a prototype, and based on
the results of prototyping,when (if at all) to invest in a design-change.
1. Set uptheevent tree(or decisiontree), whichmodels futureuncertainty. Therootnode
of the tree represents the present time. Let
N be the number of levels in this tree, i.e.,
the maximum number of branches on any root-to-leaf path in the tree. Let
M be the
number of nodes in the tree. The branches in this tree represent events, or outcomes
of tests, or information, that have an impact on the prototyping and design-change
decisions. Each node in the tree represents possible “states of the world”, or “states of
nature”, i.e. the state that would result if the sequence of events on the path from the
root to the node were to occur.
2. For each branch from a node
v to node
w, estimate the probability P
(
w
j
v
) of the
branch.
3. Choose an appropriate discount factor
R to be used on each branch of the event tree.
This could be as simple as the current risk-free interest rate or a risk-adjusted interest
rate. For instance a large discount factor can be chosen if the software engineer feels
that it is expensive to delay an implementation-change or prototypingdecision.
4. For each node
v in the tree, estimate the beneﬁt
S
(
v
) of switching to the new design
or implementation in the state of the world represented by
v. This beneﬁt could be an
immediate beneﬁt at node
v, or could be an expectation over future uncertain beneﬁts,
discountedto the present time.
5. Decide the possible levels of prototyping investments and identify them by the set of
numbers
f
0
;
1
;
2
;
:
:
:
;
c
g. Level 0 indicates that prototypingis not undertaken.
6. Clearly there are no more than
c
M possible prototyping strategies. For each possible
prototyping strategy
￿, for each node
w such that there is some ancestor
￿ of
w such
16that
￿
(
￿
)
>
0, estimate the conditional probability P
￿
(
w
). Recall that P
￿
(
w
) de-
notes the conditional probabilityof having switched to the new implementation at the
parent-node
v of
w, given that the successor-state of
v is
w, assuming that the proto-
typingstrategy
￿ has been undertaken. The estimated valuesof P
￿ reﬂect the software
engineer’s perception of how informative the prototypingstrategy
￿ is.
7. Now all the requisite quantities are in place. By the dynamic programming procedure
outlined above, compute the optimal prototyping strategy
￿
￿ and the optimal design-
change strategy
￿
￿.
8. Aslongasthecurrent stateoftheworld,i.e., thecurrentnode
v,issuchthat
￿
￿
(
v
)
=
0 ,
do not invest in prototyping; as soon as
￿
￿
(
v
)
>
0, invest immediately in a prototype
at level
￿
￿
(
v
).
9. Once the prototyping is undertaken by following strategy
￿
￿, implement the design-
change strategy
￿
￿ as follows. Change the designas soonas a node
v is reached where
￿
￿
(
v
)
=
1 .
The variousmodelparameters can be re-estimatedbased onthequalityof decisionstheylead
to, in an iterative fashion, much like in the spiral model [4] for software development.
4.4 Boehm’s example revisited
As an illustration, we now analyze Boehm’s one-period example of Subsection 4.1 in the
model just introduced. We will interpret that example from the viewpointof switchingfrom
the conservative to the bold approach. That is, we assume that the conservative approach
(C) is already in place, and we are required to decide whether to switch to approach
B.O u r
decision tree is simple: the time-0 state has two successor states at time 1: favorable(
F)
and unfavorable (
U). We want to deﬁne
S
1
(
v
),t h eadditional beneﬁt (compared to the
conservative approach) that would be realized in a time-1 state (or node)
v, by switching to
the bold approach at time 0. Thus, in the favorable state
F,
S
1
(
F
)
=
1
5
0
￿
3
0
=
1
2
0,a n d
in the unfavorable state
U,
S
1
(
F
)
=
￿
3
0
￿
3
0
=
￿
6
0. The direct cost
L of switching is
0. Note that Boehm did not consider the cost of switching. In this simple decision tree, we
cannot delay the prototypingand switching decision, i.e., we must make them at time 0. We
will take the discountingfactor
R to be 1.
Consider the imperfect prototypeat the end of Subsection 4.1, whose conditionalproba-
bilitiesare givenby(12). Thecostof thisprototypeis10, whichweviewas “level10”. Since
we are using this prototype at time 0,
￿
=
1
0at the root of the tree, and
￿
=
0at the two
depth 1 nodes. The effect of this prototype is characterized by the conditional probabilities
P
￿
1
= P
(
B
j
F
)
=
0
:
9 in state
F and P
￿
1
= P
(
B
j
U
)
=
0
:
2 in state
U. Given that we have
used the prototypingstrategy
￿, the payoff
G
￿
0 from making the switchingdecisionat time 0
is, from the deﬁnition(14):
G
￿
0
= E
(
S
1P
￿
1
=
R
)
￿
L
=
(
0
:
5
)
(
1
2
0
)
(
0
:
9
)
￿
(
0
:
5
)
(
6
0
)
(
0
:
2
)
=
4
8
:
17Thenetpayoff,takingintoaccountthecostofprototypingis,from(15): E
h
G
￿
0
=
R
0
￿
￿
=
R
￿
i
=
4
8
￿
1
0
=
3
8
: This is the net additionalpayoff of switchingto the boldapproach, compared
to the conservative approach. Since the payoff of the conservative approach is 30, the actual
payoff from choosing an implementation at time 0 based on the prototype is
3
0
+
3
8
=
6
8 ,
which matches the value obtained at the end of Section 4.1.
4.5 Another example
We illustratethe beneﬁt of usingour optionsapproach by carrying outsome computationsin
the decision tree shown in Fig 2. For this example, we assume the cost
L of switchingto the
new software design is 100. We will assume a discountfactor
R
=
1
:
1.
In the ﬁgure we show a speciﬁc prototyping strategy described by the decision rule
￿,
and a speciﬁc switching strategy described by the decision rule
￿. For instance, at the node
U,
￿
=
1
0 , meaning that prototyping is done at this node at “level 10”. Similarly, at node
UU,
￿
=
1 , meaning that the switching decision must occur at this node. It is important
to keep in mind that the beneﬁt
S
k
(
v
) shown at each node
v is the present (i.e. time-
k)
value of all future proﬁts that would be realized, if we switch to the new implementation at
the parent-node of
v, and state
v occurs. Note that there is no (non-zero) prototyping on
paths starting with DD. The switching strategy
￿ satisﬁes the constraint mentioned in the
previous subsection: on paths where prototypingis done, the switching cannot occur before
prototyping. Recall that we have modeled prototyping as inducing conditional probabilities
P
￿
k at the tree nodes.
We now compute the value of the strategies
￿ and
￿ at time 0, namely
V
￿
;
￿
0 ,a sg i v e nb y
the expression(15). First we compute the payoffs
G
￿
k at nodes where a switchingdecisionis
made, i.e. UU and DUU:
G
￿
2
(
U
U
)
=
￿
1
7
0
(
0
:
7
)
+
1
6
0
(
0
:
1
)
R
￿
1
0
0
￿
+
=
2
2
:
2
7
;
G
￿
3
(
D
U
U
)
=
1
5
0
￿
1
0
0
=
5
0
:
The expected payoff from the switchingstrategy
￿ is
E
(
￿
G
￿
=
R
￿
)
=
(
0
:
5
)
(
0
:
8
)
2
2
:
2
7
(
1
:
1
)
2
+
5
0
(
1
:
1
)
3
=
1
5
:
8
1
:
And the expected cost of the prototypingstrategy
￿ is
E
￿
￿
R
￿
￿
=
(
0
:
5
)
(
1
0
)
1
:
1
+
(
0
:
5
)
2
3
0
(
1
:
1
)
2
=
1
0
:
7
3
:
Therefore the value at time 0 of these strategies is
1
5
:
8
1
￿
1
0
:
7
3
=
5
:
0
8.
Now supposewe use the traditionalNPV approach to decide whether or not to prototype
(at level 10) and switch (at cost 100) at time 0, for a total cost of 110. Suppose that the
prototype results in a conditional probability of 0.7 of switching in state
U (beneﬁt 150),
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Figure 3: How the value of the strategies
￿ and
￿ decreases as the discount factor
R is increased.
and probability 0.4 in state
D (beneﬁt 60). The expected discounted beneﬁt is therefore
(
(
0
:
5
)
(
0
:
7
)
1
5
0
+
(
0
:
5
)
(
0
:
4
)
6
0
)
=
1
:
1
=
5
8
:
6, so the net payoff is
5
8
:
6
￿
1
1
0
=
￿
4
1
:
4 units.
The NPV approach would therefore recommend not investing in prototyping and switching
to the new implementation. However we just saw above that by using the strategies
￿ and
￿
we can get a positive expected payoff. This example illustratesa general principle:
When future beneﬁts are uncertain, it may be proﬁtable to delay the prototyp-
ing (or implementation-change) decision until the value from prototyping (or
changing the implementation)becomes large enough.
Effect of time-discounting. The larger the discount factor
R, the less is the payoff from
postponinga decision. A large value of
R can be used if it is critical that decisions be made
sooner. On the other hand, if decisions can be delayed, a smaller value of
R can be used. In
Fig. 4.5 we show how the value of the strategies
￿ and
￿ in the above example decreases as
we increase the value of
R.
Effect of uncertainty. It is intuitively clear that the greater the uncertainty of future
beneﬁts from a decision,the greater the potentialvalueof postponingthatdecision. One way
to see the effect of increasinguncertaintyis as follows: we willassume that, for some
u
>
1,
all beneﬁts on up-branches get multiplied by a factor
u, and all beneﬁts on down-branches
get multiplied by the reciprocal
1
=
u. Thus, at the node UUU, the beneﬁt is
1
7
0
u, at UUD
the beneﬁt is
1
6
0
=
u,a n da t
D
U
U the beneﬁt is
1
5
0
u. The greater the value of
u, the greater
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Figure 4: How the value of the strategies
￿ and
￿ increases as the uncertainty of future beneﬁts (as
measured by
u) is increased.
the disparity between the beneﬁts at the up and down branches out of a given node. Fig. 4
shows how the expected payoff of strategies
￿ and
￿ increases as
u is increased.
4.6 Switching to one of several alternatives
In the previous subsections we have assumed that there is some software implementation
already in place, and we considered when (if at all) to switch to a speciﬁc different imple-
mentation. We now show how this can be easily generalized to the case of switching to one
of
m possible alternatives. Recall that
P
￿
k
(
w
) for a depth
k node
v was deﬁned as the con-
ditionalprobabilityof havingswitched to the new implementationat the parent node
v of
w,
given that the successor of
v is
w. Generalizing this, we deﬁne
P
i
;
￿
k
(
w
) to be the conditional
probabilityof having switched to the
i’th alternativeat
w’s parent
v, given that the successor
of
v is
w. Next, recall that
G
￿
k
(
v
)wasdeﬁnedasthepayofffrom makinga switchingdecision
at depth
k node
v, and was calculated as the expected payoff from time
k
+
1 , given that we
are at
v. When there are
m alternatives to choose from, we should generalize this to be the
maximum of the quantity analogousto
G
￿
k
(
v
) over all alternatives:
G
￿
k
(
v
)
=
m
a
x
1
￿
i
￿
m
h
E
￿
S
k
+
1
P
i
;
￿
k
+
1
=
R
j
v
￿
￿
L
i
+
: (18)
20With these deﬁnitions, the time
k value of a speciﬁc prototyping and switching strategy is
given by (15), and the time
k value of our investment opportunityis given by equation (16).
5 Conclusion
We beganthispaper bypointingoutthelimitationsofpreviouseconomicsapproachestopro-
totyping decisions, focusing in particular on the Bayesian approach. This model recognizes
that prototyping can involve signiﬁcant expenditure, and that the beneﬁts from prototyping
depend on uncertain future events. It uses the classical economics approach to decision-
making under uncertainty, namely Net Present Value (NPV) analysis: invest in prototyping
only if the beneﬁts (on average) outweigh the costs. One problem with this approach is that
it views prototyping decisions and implementation decisions as occurring simultaneously.
It is more realistic to separate these decisions in time. Moreover, this framework does not
consider the possibilityof delaying the prototyping(or implementation)decision untilbetter
information becomes available. As a result, this approach may lead to sub-optimalprototyp-
ing decisions.
In this paper, we presented a model that addresses both these limitations: prototyping
and implementation decisions that depend on prototyping are separated, and can occur at
any time. In allowing the decisions to occur at any time, we can no longer use the classical
NPV analysis. We must instead appeal to a more advanced but well-established theory,
namely that of ﬁnancial options. The basic ideas of thisapproach to software decisionswere
introduced by the present authors in a different paper [15]. In a sense the present paper
extends that approach to software prototyping decisions. However, prototyping adds two
novel twists: Firstly, the prototyping decision can change the future payoffs. Secondly, we
are now considering two decisions(prototypinganddesign-change)rather thanjustone. The
model presented in the present paper is therefore signiﬁcantly richer.
Althoughwehave presentedhypotheticalnumericalexamples showingthatourapproach
can lead to superior decisions, we have not tested our ideas on a real software project. How-
ever we must caution that the options approach (or any other economics-based approach
for that matter) should not be applied too literally. Rather, the appropriate way to use this
methodology is to develop and justify qualitative design guidelines and principles (such as
the one at the end of the example in Section 4.5). Such principles may not always be intu-
itively obvious. This is where we see our approach as being potentiallymost useful.
We have assumed throughout(as does Boehm in [2]) that the probabilitieson the various
branches in the event tree are known exactly. However software project managers usually
only have a rough idea of these probabilities. One way to handle this is to assume that each
branch probability is known to lie in a certain range with a certain distribution. Instead of a
branchprobability,we havetherefore a probabilitydistributionover branchprobabilities. For
instance on the ﬁrst up-branch in Fig. 2, we may only know that the probabilityis uniformly
distributed between 0.25 and 0.75. We believe that our analysis can be easily extended to
handle such “fuzzy” branch probabilities.
21Another assumption of our approach is that the set of possible outcomes at each point in
the event tree is discrete. However, one might argue that outcomes may often be continuous.
Similarly, the set of possible “levels” of protoyping may be continuous. By discretizing
continuoussets appropriately, our approach can still be used to handle such cases.
The combinationof prototypingand design-changedecisionsis a specialkindof sequen-
tial investment scenario studied in ﬁnancial contexts [8], since the prototyping cost and the
cost of switching to a different implementation are, after all, investments with an uncertain
proﬁtability. A ﬁrm may invest in a large factory stageby stage, and may wantto time its de-
cisionsinorder maximizethe expectedpayoff. In a futurepaperwe plantousethesequential
investment framework to generalize the present paper to any software design problem (not
just prototyping)where a sequence of decisions must be made.
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